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1 Introduction
Standard models of choice assume that the decision-maker (DM) makes trade-
offs independently of the characteristics of the choice problem. Over the last two
decades experimental evidence has challenged this paradigm: contrary to what
standard models assume, the extent to which the DM is able to make trade-
offs crucially depends on the choice environment (e.g. number of alternatives,
amount of time pressure, etc.).
Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993) define a choice heuristic to be compen-
satory (resp., noncompensatory) whenever the DM makes (resp., does not make)
tradeoffs between attributes. Experiments typically suggest that whenever the
choice problem is relatively simple, DMs tend to follow decision strategies, such
as compensatory ones, that are accurate, but require relatively high cognitive
effort. On the contrary, whenever the choice problem gets complex, they sacri-
fice accuracy by relying on decision strategies, such as noncompensatory ones,
that require relatively little cognitive effort.1
In this note I study a simple multi-attribute market model in which con-
sumers simplify complex problems by discarding all alternatives that do not
possess some salient attribute (noncompensatory phase) and then choose by
maximizing an utility function among the alternatives that survive (compen-
satory phase), if any. Consistently with the experimental evidence, I assume
that at simple problems consumers use a compensatory choice heuristic (i.e.,
utility maximization) straight away and identify the complexity of a choice
problem with its cardinality. Firms compete a` la Stackelberg by offering menus
of multi-attribute alternatives and influencing the attribute that the consumer
considers to be salient in the noncompensatory phase via marketing.
I find that there is a tight link between the optimal menu design and market-
ing in equilibrium. If firms face technological constraints (i.e., only alternatives
that possess up to a certain number of attributes can be offered), then in any
equilibrium the leader uses product differentiation as an entry deterrence and
marketing is irrelevant. On the contrary, in any equilibrium under fixed-capital
constraints (i.e., only alternatives that possess certain specific attributes can be
offered), both firms are active in the market and whenever the consumer goes
through the noncompensatory phase marketing is not only relevant, but also
firm-specific and firms offer menus accordingly. Finally, I briefly discuss the
choice-theoretic properties of the consumer’s choice procedure and examine its
relationships with other models.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the game; Section 3 and
4 propose the equilibrium analysis; Section 5 examines the consumer’s choice
procedure in detail; Section 6 discusses the related literature, limitations, and
extensions. Proofs are relegated in the appendix.
1See for example Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993); Hauser, Ding and Gaskin (2009);
Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur (2011).
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2 A Stackelberg Game
I assume that two firms, a leader (L) and a follower (F), compete to maximize
profits in a Stackelberg game. L moves first, F observes what L does and
then chooses a strategy. Each firm’s strategy is a pair (M,m), where M ∈
2{0,1}
k \ ∅ is a menu of multi-attribute alternatives and m ∈ {1, . . . , k} the
attribute that is advertised. I assume attributes to be to be binary and interpret
alternative x ∈M possessing (resp., not possessing) attribute i whenever xi = 1
(resp., xi = 0). The cost c(M,m) ≡ κ
∑
x∈M
∑
i∈{1,...,k} xi of offering (M,m) is
given by the number of supplied attributes times a positive constant κ > 0 and
marketing is costless. A sold product yields a fixed level of revenues normalized
to £1. I assume that attributes are goods and interpret a competitor offering
({(0, . . . , 0)}, a) as it not being active in the market.
On the demand side, there is a population of consumers of measure 1 en-
dowed with a utility function u(x) ≡ ∑i αixi, where ∞ > αi > 0. I allow
for preference heterogeneity (different types can have different αs) and denote
by u ∈ U a consumer’s type in the set of consumer’s types. I assume that if
the consumer’s feasible set is simple, where by simple I mean that its cardinal-
ity is below a threshold normalized to two, then type u uses a compensatory
choice heuristic by choosing the u-highest-utility alternative available. On the
contrary, if the feasible set is complex (i.e., its cardinality is greater than two),
then type u first uses a noncompensatory choice heuristic by eliminating all
alternatives that do not possess an attribute considered to be salient (e.g. a
low-fat yogurt, a high-speed broadband, a holiday on the Red Sea, etc.). Sec-
ond, she chooses the u-highest-utility alternative available among those that
survive (if any). I assume that choosing nothing is always worse than choosing
something in terms of utility. On the path of play [(ML,mL), (MF ,mF )], the
consumer’s feasible set is ML ∪MF and her salient attribute is endogenously
determined in the following way. The salient attribute is m, if both firms ad-
vertise m (i.e., m = mL = mF ), and mF and mL with equal probability, if the
marketing messages are distinct (i.e., mL 6= mF ). Hence, if firms use distinct
marketing strategies, then there are two equally likely states of the world: one
in which the consumer’s salient attribute is mL and the other in which it is
mF . Everything is common knowledge and ties are broken in favour of the first
mover.
3 Technological Constraints
I say that menu M is feasible under technological constraints whenever M ⊆
{x ∈ {0, 1}k : ∑i xi ≤ h} for some h ≤ k. That is, a menu of products
is feasible if and only if it possesses up to h ≤ k attributes, where k is the
maximum number of attributes a product can have.
As an example assume that products are tyres and are characterized by
three attributes: winter, summer, and grip. It is technologically impossible to
produce a tyre that is suitable for both winter and summer and has an excellent
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grip. A tyre can either be suitable for winter and have an excellent grip, or be
suitable for summer and have an excellent grip, or be usable all over the year
and not have an excellent grip in neither winter nor summer.
Assume that k = 3 and h = 2. Suppose that there are two consumer’s types u
and v that occur with probability q > 12 and 1− q such that u(011) > u(101) >
u(110) and v(110) > v(011) > v(101), respectively. If the consumer is fully
rational, then marketing is irrelevant and, as long as costs are sufficiently small,
L offers a menu ({(011), (110)},mL) that contains a top-utility alternative for
every type and grabs the whole market. Is this still an L’s equilibrium strategy
if the consumer is boundedly rational?
Assume that the consumer is boundedly rational. Then, F’s best response
to L offering ({(011), (110)},mL) is ({(101)}, 1). This strategy yields to F at
least q2 market shares at a cost of 2κ. The reason is that the feasible set has
cardinality three implying that the consumer goes through the noncompensatory
phase. In at least one half of the cases the consumer’s salient attribute is 1 and
(101) is the highest utility alternative that possesses attribute 1 with probability
q. Note that, by offering ({(011), (110), (101)},mL), L grabs the whole market,
because this menu contains all u- and all v-highest-utility products that possess
attribute i for any i. This neutralizes F’s marketing, prevents F from entering
the market and, if costs are sufficiently small, constitutes an L’s equilibrium
strategy.
Proposition 1 (Technological Constraints). Assume that firms face technolog-
ical constraints and costs are sufficiently small. Then, in any equilibrium on the
path of play M∗L =
⋃
u∈U{x ∈ arg maxy∈{0,1}k u(y) : xi > 0∀i}, M∗F = {0}, and
marketing is irrelevant.
Proposition 1 generalizes the result of the above example by suggesting that
L can prevent F from entering the market by offering a menu that contains a
u-top-utility alternative that possesses attribute i for any i for any type u. As
highlighted above, the model predicts more product differentiation relative to
the case in which the consumer is fully rational. In particular products that do
not yield the maximal utility are offered with positive probability. The reason
is that products that yield the highest-utility among those that possess some
attribute i can be chosen. Therefore, if L does not offer all those products,
whether inferior or not, then F can enter the market and grab some market
shares. Thus, as long as costs are sufficiently small, L adopts product differen-
tiation as an entry deterrence and makes marketing irrelevant.
4 Fixed-capital Constraints
I say thatM is feasible under fixed-capital constraints whenever there exists a set
IˆM of l < k attributes such that M ⊆ {x ∈ {0, 1}k : {i : xi > 0}∩IˆM = ∅}. That
is, firms are constrained in terms of machinery as they cannot offer products
that possess a set IˆM of l specific attributes.
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Getting back to to the tyre-example, it might be the case that a firm pos-
sesses the machinery to produce only high-quality winter tyres, because acquir-
ing the fixed-capital needed to produce summer tyres might be too costly, though
technologically feasible. Alternatively, assume that alternatives are bottles of
whisky characterized by three attributes, such as whether the whisky is smoked,
spicy, and fruity or not. It might be the case that a distillery A cannot produce
a spicy whisky (but only a smoked and/or fruity one), because the technology
to do so is known only to distillery B.
I look for the equilibrium under the assumption that firms by offering a menu
M implicitly select their fixed-capital. That is, firms implicitly choose the set
IˆM of attributes that they cannot produce.
2 The interpretation consistent with
this analysis is that firms have a budget that they can spend in acquiring the
fixed-capital needed to produce alternatives that possess k−l specific attributes.
The choice of IM will depend on the distribution of types and their preferences.
Proposition 2 (Fixed-capital Constraints). Assume that firms face fixed-capital
constraints and costs are sufficiently small. Then, in any equilibrium both firms
are active in the market and whenever the consumer goes through the noncom-
pensatory phase marketing is relevant and firm-specific.
To fix ideas reconsider the example I have discussed in the previous section.
That is, assume that there are two consumer’s types u and v that occur with
probability q > 12 and 1− q such that u(011) > u(101) > u(110) and v(110) >
v(011) > v(101), respectively. In addition assume that l = 1, which means that
firms cannot offer products that possess one specific attribute. If the consumer
is fully rational, then L serves the most frequent type by offering (011), F the
other type by offering (110), and marketing is irrelevant.
Assume that the consumer is boundedly rational. Suppose first that mL =
1. Then L’s machinery IˆML is either {2} or {3}. If L selects machinery {2}
(resp., {3}), then L offers (101) (resp., (110)), a highest-utility alternative that
possesses attribute 1 with probability q (resp., 1− q). Since q > 1− q, then the
‘optimal machinery’ is {2}. Hence, in this case L offers ({(101)}, 1) and F best
responds with ({(110), (100)}, 2) yielding a profit of q2 − 2κ to L, where (100) is
a cheapest alternative whose only purpose is to make the feasible set complex.
Note that by adding products to menu {(101)}, L does not gain market shares,
but costs increase.
By similar arguments, when mL = 2, the optimal machinery is {1}, L offers
(011), F best responds with ({(110), (100)}, 1), and L obtains q2 − 2κ and when
mL = 3, the optimal machinery is {1}, L offers (011), F best responds with
({(101), (100)}, 1), and L obtains 12−2κ. The marketing strategy that maximizes
L’s profits is mL = 3. Therefore, the equilibrium strategies on the path of play
are ({(011)}, 3) and ({(101), (100)}, 1) for L and F, respectively.3
2In the case in which fixed-capital constraints are exogenously given, the two versions
(technological and fixed-capital constraints) of the model differ whenever IˆML 6= IˆMF . If, on
the contrary, IˆML = IˆMF , then firms face technological constraints such that products can
possess at most k − l attributes.
3F’s best response to L offering ({(011)}, 3) is also ({(110), (100)}, 1), which leads exactly
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Interestingly, unlike technological constraints, fixed-capital constraints im-
ply that not only both firms are active in the market, but also marketing is
strategically relevant and firm-specific in equilibrium whenever consumers go
through the noncompensatory phase. In particular, while L uses positive mar-
keting, F adopts negative marketing. That is, on the one hand, L decides to
advertise attribute mL only because its products possess that attribute in order
to maximize the probability that its products are chosen when the consumer’s
salient attribute is mL. On the other hand, F chooses to advertise an attribute
among those that the products offered by L do not have and offers a menu
accordingly.
5 Choice-theoretic Properties of the Consumer’s
Choice Procedure
Let X ⊆ {0, 1}k be the grand set of alternatives, with 2 < k < ∞. Let I ≡
{1, . . . , k} be the set of attributes. Denote by I(x) ≡ {i ∈ I|xi > 0} the set
of attributes that x possesses. Let D ⊆ 2X \ ∅ be a choice domain. I denote
a choice problem by A ∈ D. I assume that the set {A ∈ 2X \ ∅ : |A| = 2}
of binary choice problems to be a subset of D. A choice function maps D
into X ∪ {∅} with the property that c(A) ∈ A ∪ {∅}. Given A ∈ D, let A(i)
be defined as {y ∈ A|i ∈ I(y)} if {y ∈ A|i ∈ I(y)} 6= ∅ and {∅}, otherwise.
That is, A(i) denotes the set of alternatives in A that possess attribute i. Let
UCx,A ≡ {y ∈ A|y = c({x, y})} be the set of alternatives in A that beat x in
pairwise comparison.
Consider the following axioms.
A1 (binary transitivity): if x = c({x, y}) and y = c({y, z}), then z =
c({x, z}).
A2 (binary Pareto): if I(x) ⊂ I(y), then y = c({x, y}).
A3 (binary nonemptyness): c(A) 6= ∅ for any A ∈ D such that |A| ≤ 2.
A4: let |A| > 2. If c(A) = ∅, then A(i) = {∅} for some i ∈ I.
A5: let x ∈ A and |A| > 2. If A(i) ∩ UCx,A 6= ∅ for any i ∈ I(x), then
c(A) 6= x.
Axioms A1-A3 are standard properties. A4 requires that a necessary condi-
tion for the choice function to be empty is that there must be an attribute that
all alternatives available do not possess. A5 says that an alternative x has to
be discarded if for any attribute i that x possesses there is another alternative
to the same outcome.
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y that possesses attribute i and is chosen over x in pairwise comparison.
Proposition 3 (Axiomatic Characterization of the Consumer’s Choice Proce-
dure). A choice function c satisfies A1-A5 if and only if there exist a strictly
increasing utility function u : {0, 1}k ∪ {∅} → < such that I(y) ⊂ I(x) implies
u(x) > u(y) and {∅} = arg miny∈X∪{∅} u(y), and, for any A ∈ D, an attribute
iA ∈ I such that
{c(A)} ≡ arg max
x∈Φ(A)
u(x)
where
Φ(A) ≡
{
A if |A| ≤ 2
A(iA) if |A| > 2
When the above occurs we say that c is a choice with limited tradeoffs
(CLT).4
The consumer’s choice procedure clearly violates WARP, as it might be the
case that x is chosen over y in pairwise comparison, but y is chosen at the more
complex problem {x, y, z} because y is the best alternative that possesses a
certain attribute.5 Does then CLT incorporate the standard model as a special
case?
Proposition 4 (Relationships with the Standard Model). Assume that the
choice domain D contains all subsets of the grand set of alternatives up to
three elements, the choice function is never empty, and attributes are goods.
Let CLT∗ be a CLT such that, for any A ∈ D, iA ∈ I(x∗A), where x∗A ∈
arg maxy∈A∪{∅} u(y). Then, c is an CLT∗ if and only if it satisfies WARP.
If the salient attribute is ‘optimally’ selected (i.e., it is possessed by the
highest-utility alternative at any choice problem), then the resulting CLT is
equivalent to a standard maximization procedure.
In the remaining of this section I discuss two well-known models of boundedly
rational choice. Manzini and Mariotti (2007) propose a model in which the DM
makes a decision by sequentially applying two binary relations according to a
fixed ordering. On the one hand, unlike my model, Manzini and Mariotti (2007)
can explain binary cycles. On the other hand, my model violates their axioms
(e.g. WWARP: let {x, y} ⊂ A ⊂ B, if x = c({x, y}) = c(B), then y 6= c(A))
implying that the two models do not contain one another.
Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012) assume that the DM chooses her
most preferred alternative among those considered by imposing that the set
of considered alternatives, which they call ‘attention filter’, does not change if
an alternative that does not attract attention is removed. Unlike Masatlioglu,
Nakajima and Ozbay (2012), my model cannot explain binary cycles. However,
my model violates their restriction imposed on the attention filter. Hence, the
two models are different.
4In the appendix I show that the axioms are independent.
5WARP: let x, y ∈ A ∩B. If x = c(A), then y 6= c(B).
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6 Related Literature and Extensions
The paper is related to the literature on bounded rationality and industrial
organization.6 Both Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013) and Dahremoeller
and Fels (2013) propose a multi-attribute model in which consumers may devote
more attention to an attribute relative to another, attributes are non-binary,
and salience is endogenous. Unlike my model, Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer
(2013) assume that the consumer’s consideration set always coincides with the
feasible set and the salience of a product’s attribute is an increasing function of
the relative distance between its value and the average of that attribute value
across feasible products. On the contrary, in my model the consideration set is
endogenous and salience is determined by marketing, which is a separate firm’s
decision. On the other hand, while Dahremoeller and Fels (2013) investigate a
monopoly, I examine a duopoly.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) propose a market model in which firms compete on
quality and can influence the consumer’s consideration set via costly marketing
messages.7 Piccione and Spiegler (2012), on the other hand, extend Bertrand
competition by assuming that firms can influence the extent to which the DM
is able to compare alternatives by putting in practice some costless marketing
device.8 Unlike these models, mine investigates a sequential game and assumes
that marketing influences the noncompensatory phase of the decision process.
My work could be extended in multiple ways. First, the assumption that
attributes are binary is clearly a limitation of this work. In the real world
attributes can be both binary and non-binary, the most prominent non-binary
attribute being the price. The fact that interesting results can be obtained
out of a simple binary world suggests that an extension to a binary/non-binary
framework might be promising as well.
Second, I identify complexity with cardinality, which I believe is a reasonable
assumption. However, a more realistic definition of complexity would need
to take into account other dimensions, such as the number of attributes, the
amount of time pressure, and the extent to which the consumer is familiar with
the products under consideration. Moreover, I normalize the threshold that
defines a choice problem to be complex to two. Unlike other modifications of
the model, increasing the threshold would not change the results qualitatively,
as it would simply imply that firms have to offer more complicated menus to
make consumers go through the noncompensatory phase.
Third, I assume that all consumer types react in the same way to a marketing
strategy. It might be the case that different types with different utility functions
react differently depending on the extent to which the advertised attribute is
important in the utility function.
6As an example see Spiegler (2012). Recent surveys of this literature are Ellison (2006),
Armstrong (2008), and Spiegler (2011).
7Choice-theoretic studies on the consideration set are, for example, Eliaz, Richter and
Rubinstein (2011) and the already discussed Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and Masatlioglu,
Nakajima and Ozbay (2012).
8See Spiegler (2013) for an extension.
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Fourth, I study a sequential game, which captures many reasonable situa-
tions (e.g. incumbent vs challenging firm). An interesting question would be to
study the same game under the assumption that firms move simultaneously. I
leave these extensions for future research.
A Proofs
Proposition 1. Assume that firms can offer products that possess up to h ≤ k
attributes and costs are sufficiently small. Assume that M∗L =
⋃
u∈U{x ∈
arg maxy∈{0,1}k u(y) : xi > 0∀i}, M∗F = {0}, and marketing is anything. On
this path of play L obtains 1 − κ∑x∈M∗L∑i∈{1,...,k} xi. F cannot profitable
deviate. Assume that L deviates by offering M∗L \ {x′} for some x′ ∈M∗L. Since
x′ ∈ M∗L, then x′ is the u-highest-utility alternative that possesses attribute
i for some u ∈ U and some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Then, F’s best response is to
offer ({x′}, i). This deviation yields 1 − A − κ∑x∈M∗L\{x′}∑i∈{1,...,k} xi to L,
where A ∈
{
Prob(type u)
2 , P rob(type u)
}
depending on whether m∗L 6= i or not,
respectively. The assumption that costs are sufficiently small ensures that the
deviation is not profitable, a contradiction. Adding products to M∗L does not
increase market shares, but strictly increases costs. Hence, the above is an
equilibrium.
Suppose, by contradiction, that ((M ′L,m
′
L), (M
′
F ,m
′
F )) 6= ((M∗L,m∗L), (M∗F ,m∗F ))
is another equilibrium. I have already examined the case in which M∗L ⊂ M ′L.
Hence, suppose M∗L 6⊂M ′L. I distinguish two cases.
Case (i): at ((M ′L,m
′
L), (M
′
F ,m
′
F )) F obtains no market shares. Hence, F
makes negative profits unless M ′F = {(0, . . . , 0)}. Since M∗L 6⊂ M ′L, then F has
an incentive to deviate to (MF , j) such that x ∈MF , where x ∈M∗L \M ′L. By
construction, x is the u-highest utility alternative that possesses attribute i for
some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and some u ∈ U . Let j ≡ i. Then at the deviation F obtains
at least
Prob(type u)
2 market shares at a cost of at least
∑
x∈MF
∑
i∈{1,...,k} xi.
As long as costs are sufficiently small, the deviation is profitable, a contradiction.
Case (ii): at ((M ′L,m
′
L), (M
′
F ,m
′
F )) F obtains some market shares. Then L
has an incentive to deviate to (M∗L,m
∗
L), as this strategy ensures that L obtains
the whole market. If costs are sufficiently small, the deviation is profitable,
which leads to a contradiction. Hence, there are no other equilibria.
Proposition 2. Assume that in equilibrium the consumer does not go through
the noncompensatory phase (NP). That is, |ML ∪MF | = 2. I first show that
such an equilibrium exists. Assume that there are two types u and v that
occur with probability 12 . Assume that {x} = arg maxy∈{0,1}k u(y), {z} =
arg maxy∈{0,1}k v(y), and {x} = arg maxy∈{0,1}k\{z} v(y). Suppose that L chooses
({x},mL) and F ({z},mF ), where mL is possessed by x and mF by z yielding
1
2 market shares to each firm. I claim that (({x},mL), ({z},mF )) is an equilib-
rium. Suppose not. Then, there is a profitable deviation. Note that L and F
cannot profitably deviate to a strategy ({w},m). If F does so, then it obtains
zero market shares. The same holds for L, unless L offers {z} (at the deviation
F would respond with x and L would obtain exactly 12 market shares), but the
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deviation would still not be profitable. Next, assume that assume that L de-
viates to (M ′L,m
′
L) such that |M ′L| ≥ 2. F’s best response implies that F can
grab at least 12 of the market shares by offering one alternative that possesses an
attribute that the products in ML do not have and advertising that attribute.
Hence, L obtains at most 12 market shares at the deviation, but costs are at
least as high. Finally, assume that F deviates to a strategy (M ′F ,m
′
F ) such that
ML is a doubleton menu. F can grab at most
1
2 of the market shares, as even
though there is some t ∈ M ′F such that t possesses attribute mL, t is always
beaten by x.
Next, I show that in any equilibrium both firms are active in the market.
That is, Mi 6= {(0, . . . , 0)} with i ∈ {L,F}. Suppose not. Assume first that
ML = {(0, . . . , 0)} 6= MF . L can deviate to ({x},mL) such that mL is possessed
by x and the probability that x is a highest-utility product is maximized. This
deviation yields positive market shares, a contradiction. Next, assume that
MF = {(0, . . . , 0)} 6= ML. F can deviate to ({z, t},mF ) such that mF ∈ IˆML ,
mF is possessed by z, z is a highest-utility product with positive probability,
and t is a cheapest alternative whose only purpose is to make the feasible set
complex. This deviation yields positive market shares, a contradiction.
Assume that in equilibrium the consumer goes through the NC. An example
of such an equilibrium is provided in the main body. I argue by backward
induction that in any equilibrium in which the consumer goes through the NP
marketing is relevant and firm-specific. Assume that L offers (ML,mL). Then, F
advertises an attribute mF ∈ IˆML that the products offered by L do not possess
and offers an alternative that possesses mF and (if feasible) mL. Denote the
cheapest corresponding menu by (M∗F ,m
∗
F ). This ensures that F grabs at least
1
2 market shares and competition occurs only in the state of the world in which
the consumer’s essential attribute is mL.
Assume that F chooses (M∗F ,m
∗
F ). L’s best response is as follows. First,
fix a marketing strategy mL and a ‘machinery’ IˆML . Then, construct a menu
ML(mL, IML) that contains all u-highest-utility alternatives that possess at-
tribute mL. Second, identify the optimal machinery Iˆ
∗
ML
that maximizes the
probability that x ∈ ML(mL, IˆML) is a u-highest-utility alternative that pos-
sesses mL and denote the corresponding ML(mL, Iˆ
∗
ML
) by ML(mL). Third,
select the optimal marketing strategy m∗L that maximizes the probability that
products in ML(mL) are chosen when the consumer’s salient attribute is mL
and denote the cheapest corresponding menu ML(m
∗
L) by M
∗
L.
Independence of the Axioms. Let x = (110), y = (101), z = (011), and w =
(001).
• c satisfies all axioms, but A5. Let X = {x, y, z} and assume that x =
c({x, y}), x = c({x, z}), y = c({y, z}), and z = c(X).
• c satisfies all axioms, but A4. Let X = {x, y, z} and assume that x =
c({x, y}), x = c({x, z}), y = (c({y, z}), and ∅ = c(X).
• c satisfies all axioms, but A3. Let X = {x, y, z} and assume that x =
c({x, y}), x = c({x, z}), ∅ = c({y, z}), and x = c(X).
• c satisfies all axioms, but A2. Let X = {x, y, w} and assume that x =
c({x, y}), x = c({x, z}), w = c({y, w}), and x = c(X).
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• c satisfies all axioms, but A1. Let X = {x, y, z} and assume that x =
c({x, y}), z = c({x, z}), y = c({y, z}), and x = c(X).
Proposition 3. Necessity. Assume that c is a CLT. A1-A3 are clearly satisfied.
Assume, by contradiction, that A4 is violated. Then, c(A) = ∅ implies that
A(i) 6= {∅} for all i ∈ I. Let iA be any attribute in I. Then, ∅ /∈ Φ(A) implying
that c(A) 6= ∅, a contradiction.
Next, assume, by contradiction, that A5 is violated. Then, A(i)∩UCx,A 6= ∅
for any i ∈ I(x) implies that x = c(A). If iA /∈ I(x), the contradiction arises
immediately. Hence, assume that iA ∈ I(x). Then, x ∈ Φ(A). However, since
A(i)∩UCx,A 6= ∅ for any i ∈ I(x), then ∃y ∈ Φ(A) such that u(y) > u(x). This
implies that x /∈ arg maxz∈Φ(A) u(z) and consequently x 6= c(A), which leads to
a contradiction.
Sufficiency. Assume that c satisfies A1-A5. By A3 the choice function is
never empty at binary choice problems. Let x → y whenever x = c({x, y})
be the revealed preference relation. By A1 and standard arguments, → is a
strict rational preference relation. Since c satisfies A2, then x → y whenever
I(y) ⊂ I(x). Let u : {0, 1}k ∪ {∅} → < be such that u(x) > u(y) whenever
x→ y and {∅} = arg miny∈X∪{∅} u(y).
Let A ∈ D be any choice problem. Let cCLT (A) ≡ arg maxy∈Φ(A) u(y) for
some Φ(A) ⊆ A ∪ {∅}. I want to show that c(A) = cCLT (A). I distinguish two
cases.
Case (i): |A| = 2. Let Φ(A) = A. Assume that x = c(A) and suppose, by
contradiction, that x 6= cCLT (A). Then, u(y) > u(x), where y is the unique
alternative in Φ(A)\{x}. However, the fact that x = c(A) implies, by construc-
tion, that u(x) > u(y), a contradiction. Hence, c(A) = cCLT (A).
Case (ii): |A| > 2. Let Φ(A) ≡ A(iA) for some iA ∈ I. I distinguish two
sub-cases.
Sub-case (a): c(A) = ∅. By A4, A(j) = {∅} for some j ∈ I. Let iA = j.
Then, Φ(A) = {∅} and consequently cCLT (A) = ∅, as desired.
Sub-case (b): x = c(A) 6= ∅. By A5, there exists j ∈ I(x) such that
A(j)∩UCx,A = ∅. Let iA = j. Then, Φ(A)∩UCx,A = ∅ implying that x is the
highest-utility alternative in Φ(A). Hence, cCLT (A) = x, as desired.
Proposition 4. Necessity. Assume first that c is a CLT∗. Since iA ∈ I(x∗A)
for any A ∈ D, where {x∗A} = arg maxy∈A∪{∅} u(y), then x∗A ∈ Φ(A) for any
A ∈ D. This implies that {c(A)} = arg maxy∈A∪{∅} u(y) 6= ∅. Let x  y if
and only if u(x) > u(y) be the preference induced by the utility function. Note
that  is a strict rational preference relation. Then, at any A ∈ D, c(A) is the
-maximal element of A. By Arrow (1959), c satisfies WARP.
Sufficiency. In the other direction, assume that c satisfies WARP. Since
attributes are goods, then c satisfies A2. Next, since D contains all subsets
of X up to three elements and the choice function is never empty, then, by
Arrow (1959), {c(A)} = max(A;) for some strict rational preference . Since
c satisfies A2, then I(y) ⊂ I(x) implies that x  y. Let u(x) > u(y) if and only if
x  y and {∅} = arg miny∈X∪{∅} u(y). For every A ∈ D, let iA ∈ I(x∗A), where
{x∗A} = arg maxy∈A∪{∅} u(y). Let cCLT∗ ≡ arg maxy∈Φ(A) u(y) , where Φ(A) is
equal to A(iA) if |A| > 2 and to A, otherwise. I want to show that c = cCLT∗ .
Assume that x = c(A) and suppose, by contradiction, that x 6= cCLT∗(A).
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Then, u(y) > u(x) for some y ∈ A \ {x} or, equivalently, y  x for some
y ∈ A \ {x}. Hence, x /∈ max(A;). However, this implies that x 6= c(A), a
contradiction.
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